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Clean energy for all Europeans  
Clean energy for all Europeans 
On 30 November 2016 the Commission published its 
so-called ‘Winter Package’ of eight proposals to 
facilitate the transition to a ‘clean energy economy’ and 
to reform the design and operation of the European 
Union’s electricity market.1 This bumper package of 
proposals can be grouped into three categories: 
proposals amending existing energy market legislation; 
proposals amending existing climate change 
legislation; and proposals for new measures. In EU 
jargon a full revision of an existing measure is known 
as a ‘recast’. 
The first category of measures is aimed to bringing 
about a new market design – also known as the market 
design initiative (MDI) and includes a new directive 
amending and repealing Directive 2009/72 (E-
Directive)
2
, a new regulation on the internal electricity 
market, amending and repealing Regulation 714/2009 
(E-Regulation)
3
, as well as a new regulation repealing 
Regulation 713/2009 on the ACER (ACER 
Regulation)
4
, usually referred to as the third package 
of electricity market liberalisation measures. Certain 
measures are intended to enter into force and to apply 
as from 1 January 2020, while for others, such as the 
recast ED, no timetable for transposition has yet been 
indicated.  
The second category of measures aims to better align 
and integrate climate change goals into this new market 
design. This category includes a fully revised 
Renewables Directive 2009/28 (RED)
5
 and a fully 
revised Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27 (EED)
6
, 
both to enter into force on 1 January 2021. Lastly, the 
proposal for a new regulation on risk-preparedness in 
                                                          
1
 The Winter Package consists of a package of legislative 
measures to facilitate the transition to a clean energy 
economy. The overall objectives of each proposed measure 
are briefly outlined in the Commission Communication ‘Clean 
Energy for all Europeans’, COM (2016) 860 final. 
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v9.pdf 
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v7.pdf 
4
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v8_0.pdf 
5
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v7_1.pdf 
6
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v16.pdf 
the electricity sector (the Risk Regulation)
7
 and a 
proposed regulation on Governance of the Energy 
Union (the Governance Regulation)
8
 (both to enter 
into force on 1 January 2021) are entirely new 
measures.  
The publication of these drafts – which amount to more 
than 1000 pages of dense legal text – marks the 
beginning of a long and undoubtedly complex 
negotiating process. It is more than likely that the final 
versions to be eventually adopted by the Council and 
the European Parliament will look very different from 
these latest proposals. At the same time, the publication 
of the Winter Package marks an important step change 
in the organisation as well as the regulation of the EU 
electricity market and raises a number of novel legal 
issues and challenges. This Briefing Paper provides an 
initial overview of the interaction between the different 
proposals and highlights some of the major issues that 
arise in the different segments of the energy value 
chain. 
 
                                                          
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v7.pdf 
8
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v9_759.pdf 
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BOX 1: LIST OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
 Proposal for a recast of the Internal Electricity Market Directive 
 Proposal for a recast of the Internal Electricity Market Regulation 
 Proposal for a recast of the ACER Regulation 
 Proposal for a Regulation on Risk-Preparedness in the Electricity Sector and Repealing the Security of Supply 
Directive 
 Proposal for a recast of the Renewable Energy Directive 
 Proposal for a revised Energy Efficiency Directive 
 Proposal for a revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
 Proposal for a Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union 
Why a new market design for the 
EU electricity sector? 
The Commission, backed by the Council, has embraced 
an ambitious plan for the European Union’s electricity 
market. It will be a major instrument in realising the 
transition to a low carbon economy by 2050. This 
means that EU citizens as well as industrial users 
should gradually switch to electricity not only as a 
source of light, heating and cooling but also 
transportation. That electricity should in turn be 
generated or produced from low carbon sources, 
including non-fossil fuels such as hydro, solar and 
wind energy but also biofuels, biomass and biogases. 
As before, nuclear energy is not included in the 
definition of ‘energy from renewable sources’ in 
Article 2 of the recast RED. 
The rapidly increasing share of renewable energy 
sources (RES) in electricity generation (targeted to be 
at least 50% by 2030),
9
 together with more 
decentralised production and self-consumption, has 
also called into question traditional electricity market 
models, on which the EU’s current ‘third package’ of 
legislation is based. Increased reliance on renewable 
energy sources such as wind and solar poses major 
technical as well as economic and, in turn, legal 
challenges for the EU institutions and the Member 
States. A decentralised market has more players and 
creates new roles such as aggregators and ‘prosumers’. 
At the same time Europe’s electricity market is now 
                                                          
9
 European Council (23 and 24 October 2014), Doc SN79/14. 
better interlinked through interconnecting networks. 
This has both advantages and disadvantages.  
Greater intermittency in supplies – if the wind does not 
blow or the sun does not shine – has created a need for 
more flexibility and responsiveness both on the supply 
and the demand side. The market needs to price the 
costs involved in providing that flexibility and reflect 
them in the overall price of energy and/or energy 
services. Flexibility services can and should be 
provided across an interlinked market.
10
 If the market 
does not function properly Member States will be 
tempted to take unilateral measures to ensure 
generation adequacy. These so-called capacity 
remuneration mechanisms, if not properly designed, 
can have major adverse consequences on the 
functioning of the internal electricity market, as the 
Commission has established in its final report on the 
Sector Inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms. These types 
of mechanisms can distort market prices, favour certain 
actors above others, and create new barriers to trade. 
This document was published on the same day as the 
Winter Package.
11
  
Even where markets and systems function well, 
however, the risk of an electricity crisis cannot be 
excluded and the consequences of such crises are likely 
                                                          
10
 See also the Commission’s memo: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/techni
cal_memo_marketsconsumers.pdf 
11
 Com (2016) 860 final 
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to be felt beyond national borders, especially in 
interlinked markets. Crisis prevention and management 
cannot be considered a purely national responsibility. 
Why new or recast 
instruments are needed 
The combined challenges of stimulating competition 
on EU electricity markets in the short term but 
encouraging and coordinating investment in generation 
capacity, systems and network infrastructure in the 
longer term, calls for a new market design and with it 
an overhaul of the existing EU legislation. This also 
requires a review of the governance of the EU 
electricity market. State intervention in the electricity 
sector is unlikely to fade away even if energy markets 
can function more efficiently in the short term. 
Moreover it is a central assumption of the Winter 
Package that markets cannot (reformed or otherwise) 
be relied upon to deliver targets on RES production by 
a certain deadline, otherwise those very targets would 
not be necessary. The Clean Energy transition package 
is predicated on a considerable degree of public 
intervention but, in contrast to the measures it seeks to 
replace, it has high aspirations for the effective 
co-ordination of that intervention at Union level.  
 
As the Commission’s accompanying press statement 
announced, the Winter Package should deliver ‘clean 
energy for all Europeans’. It points out that the 
Commission proposals touch on all energy-related 
sectors, including electricity generation, heating and 
cooling and transport, but also agriculture and land use, 
and clear the way for a more competitive, modern and 
cleaner energy system. The Commission considers that 
while its previous three legislative packages have 
broadly delivered on their aims, they are no longer 
fully fit for purpose in a changing electricity market 
nor can the old approach realise the ‘clean energy 
transition’ to a low carbon economy by 2050. 
Legal Basis  
The introduction of a new market design across 28 
national markets (27 if the UK does not participate) is 
an ambitious enterprise and is not without legal 
complexity. The new proposals are based on Article 
194 of the TFEU – the energy title introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. That Article confirms that 
energy policy issues are a shared competence between 
the EU and the Member States. In addition the 
somewhat obscure text of Article 194(2) may be 
interpreted to allow Member States to unilaterally 
determine their own ‘energy mix’, irrespective of the 
proposed RES targets. 
The issues 
Given the height of the EC’s ambitions and the scope 
and complexity of the new proposals, it is impossible 
to analyse each of the proposed measures in full here. 
The aim of this Briefing Paper is to highlight some of 
the main challenges for specific actors in the energy 
value chain (see Box 2): given the density and 
complexity of the proposals, only key provisions will 
be singled out here for comment. 
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BOX 2: ENERGY VALUE CHAIN 
 
Generation 
Promoting renewables and (maybe) keeping fossil fuelled 
plant on line (capacity markets) 
On the basis of previously adopted binding national 
targets, Member States are required by the current RED 
to boost the share of RES by 2020 to 20% of final 
energy consumption. This now becomes the baseline 
for each Member State as of 2020. A new EU-wide 
target of 27% (as opposed to individual national 
targets) has been set for 2030. Although often criticised 
for its lack of ambition, it is generally recognised that 
continuing state financial support will still be required 
to meet this target. But non-coordinated state support is 
a threat to the very core of the internal market ideal. 
Unlike its predecessor of 2009, the recast RED takes 
Article 194(2) TFEU as its legal basis. Unlike its 
predecessor it contains very few mandatory 
requirements – one notable exception being the 
proposed Article 5 on the mandatory opening of 
support scheme to generators based in other Member 
States. 
We have identified the following challenges for further 
comment:  
 
BOX 3: GENERATION 
 Ensuring long-term stability and predictability for 
investors in RES. 
 What if the EU misses its own target?  
 Can RES suppliers in one Member State benefit 
from subsidies in another? 
 What is the legitimate role of so-called ‘capacity 
markets’? 
Long-term stability for investors 
The draft RED
12
 complements the MDI by introducing 
different measures aimed at attracting investments in 
the medium and long term and by reducing 
administrative burdens on RES producers, including so 
called “prosumers”. Investments needed in generation 
from renewable energy sources to meet the targets for 
2030 (i.e. those between 2015-2030 are estimated at 
Euro 1 trillion). Strengthening investors’ certainty is 
                                                          
12
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_ 
en_act_part1_v7_1.pdf 
Briefing Paper | Prof. L. Hancher and Mr. B.M. Winters | February 2017 7 
 
© Allen & Overy LLP 2017 
crucial and is one of the specific objectives of the 
proposal. But investment levels in renewables have 
dropped by some 60% compared to 2011 – a drop not 
just caused by the reduction in technology costs. 
Retroactive changes to national support schemes in 
several Member States have also undermined investor 
confidence. The Commission has stated that this 
“highlights the need to reflect on how investors’ 
legitimate interests can be better protected”.13  Two 
provisions are aimed at this objective.  
Article 6: 
“Without prejudice to adaptations necessary to comply 
with State aid rules, Member States shall ensure that 
the level of, and conditions attached to, the support 
granted to renewable energy projects are not revised in 
a way that negatively impacts the rights conferred 
thereunder and the economics of supported projects.” 
Article 15(3): 
“Member States shall ensure that investors have 
sufficient predictability of the planned support for 
energy from renewable sources. To this aim, Member 
States shall define and publish a long-term schedule in 
relation to expected allocation for support, covering at 
least the following 3 years and including for each 
scheme the indicative timing, the capacity, the budget 
expected to be allocated, as well as a consultation of 
stakeholders on the design of the support.” 
Finally Article 15(9) requires Member States to remove 
administrative barriers to corporate long-term power 
purchase agreements ( PPAs) to finance renewables 
and facilitate their uptake.  
Certain privileges will disappear, however, including 
priority dispatch for new RES installations as well as 
exemptions from balancing charges.. 
What happens if the EU targets are 
missed?  
Article 5(2) of the revised RED states that Member 
States shall collectively ensure that the sum of their 
contributions must add up to the Union-wide target of 
at least 27% by 2030. Detailed reporting on national 
efforts is key here.  
The proposed Governance Regulation brings together 
the scattered planning and reporting obligations from 
                                                          
13
 (at p57 SWD) - 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1_en_ 
impact_assessment_part1_v4_418.pdf 
the main pieces of EU legislation, across energy 
climate and other related policy areas. It streamlines 
the more than 50 existing individual planning, 
reporting and monitoring obligations in the energy and 
climate acquis (integrating 31 and deleting 23) into an 
integrated national plan, which in turn will cover the 
five dimensions of the Energy Union (energy security, 
energy market, energy efficiency, decarbonisation 
and R&D).  
Article 3 of Chapter 2 sets out the obligations for 
Member States to produce a national integrated energy 
and climate plan for the period 2021 to 2030 by 
1 January 2019, and for subsequent ten year periods.
14
 
Annex 1 provides a binding template for the plans. The 
integrated plan will cover binding national targets for 
GHG emissions, commitments for land use reductions, 
national contributions to the EU binding target for RES 
consumption, indicative national energy efficiency 
targets to meet the EU binding energy efficiency target 
of 30% as well as national objectives on the 
diversification of energy sources and the supply and 
reduction of energy import dependency.  
Chapter five deals with Commission monitoring and 
assessment, including biennial progress reports and 
follow up (Articles 16 to 22). If, having assessed these 
complex plans, the Commission establishes that the 
Union trajectory is not met collectively or that national 
baselines are not respected, then Article 27(4) of the 
Governance Regulation shall apply. This provision sets 
out several options for Member States to increase their 
contributions to the RES target. One such option – 
which is likely to prove controversial – is a 
requirement to make a financial contribution to a 
financing platform to be set up at Union level to 
contribute to renewable energy projects, managed 
directly or indirectly by the Commission. 
Opening up national support schemes 
Article 5 introduces the mandatory opening of national 
support schemes to RES installations located in other 
Member States even if this is only on a gradual basis. 
At least 10% of newly supported capacity must be 
opened up annually between 2021 and 2025, and at 
least 15% for the period 2026 to 2030. It is up to the 
individual Member State to decide on the mechanics of 
opening its schemes up to cross-border participation. 
The allocation of RES benefiting from different 
national contributions shall be the subject of a 
                                                          
14
 Draft national plans should be submitted by 1 January 2018 
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co-operation agreement on the cross-border 
disbursement of funding.  
Stimulating increased cross-border participation in 
national support schemes is controversial – taxpayers 
may be reluctant to fund projects in another Member 
State. It also requires further harmonisation measures. 
The new proposal contains complex and detailed rules 
to facilitate the mutual recognition of guarantees of 
origin, for example. 
Capacity market mechanisms 
The final Report on the Sector Inquiry on Capacity 
Mechanisms was published to coincide with the 
publication of the Winter Package.
15
 It presents the 
main findings of the Commission’s first sector-wide 
inquiry under the new Procedural Regulation
16
 for the 
application of the EU State Aid Regime.
17
 The inquiry 
was launched in April 2015. In response to threatened 
shortages of electricity several Member States have, or 
plan to introduce, various types of capacity 
mechanisms to remunerate electricity generators (and 
in some cases, demand response providers). These 
mechanisms often fall to be assessed under Article 
107(1) of the TFEU and the Energy and Environmental 
Aid Guidelines (EEAG) of 2014.
18
 Although the EU as 
a whole is currently in a situation of overcapacity, 
some countries may well face genuine security of 
supply challenges. Large numbers of existing power 
plants will be phased out in the near future, as they 
cannot meet EU emission and environmental standards. 
Declining demand, lower prices and lower utilisation 
rates have also reduced the profitability of 
conventional, fossil-fuelled generation. Nevertheless 
flexible conventional technologies are still key to 
providing adequate reliability to compensate 
intermittent, RES-based generation. However, low 
levels of expected profitability may deter future 
investment and this in turn threatens security of supply 
in the longer run. The Sector Inquiry aimed to verify 
whether well functioning markets are able to trigger 
sufficient investment in capacity to meet future demand 
and to identify the market and regulatory failures that 
hinder investment.  
The Sector Inquiry indeed identified a number of 
market failures some of which are expected to be dealt 
with by the MDI. In the meantime if markets do not 
                                                          
15
 Com (2016) 752 final 
16
 Article 25 of Regulation 2015/1589 OJ L248/9. 
17
 Articles 107 and 108 TFEU 
18
 OJ 2014 L200/1 
provide the right signals and do not deliver high prices 
at times of scarcity, investment will not take place. In 
the absence of adequate tools to stimulate price 
responsive demand by final consumers, national 
authorities often cap retail prices. National rules for 
managing balancing markets may in practice cap the 
price in forward markets. Other forms of price 
distortion caused from a failure to delineate bidding 
zones in an appropriate manner undermine cross-border 
trade and reduce incentives to invest in new 
interconnector capacity.  
Finally even if these market failures are removed, and 
it is the goal of the MDI to address all the above issues, 
investors may still be reluctant to build new capacity 
owing to uncertainty about future market 
developments, including the impact of the increasing 
share of RES in the market, and potentially, extreme 
price volatility. If the introduction of capacity 
mechanisms is to be justified, and in accordance with 
the MDI, it must be based on a rigorous, objective and 
thorough assessment of the extent and nature of the 
potential threat to system adequacy. This is to be based 
on a coordinated European resource adequacy 
assessment and on a harmonised method as well as 
commonly defined reliability standards.  
The Final Report also analyses how Member States 
should ‘get the design right’ if they choose to set up a 
capacity scheme. One element of this exercise is 
ensuring adequate cross-border participation. As the 
Final Report concludes “capacity mechanisms must be 
open to explicit cross-border participation in order to 
minimise distortions to cross-border competition and 
trade, ensure incentives for continued investment in 
interconnection and reduce the long-term costs of 
European security of supply”.19 
                                                          
19
 See p. 18 
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Cross-border participation in capacity 
mechanisms 
Article 21 of the E-Regulation requires that capacity 
providers located in another Member State shall be 
able to participate in market-wide capacity 
mechanisms. In order to realise this objective complex 
technical rules must be developed in cooperation with 
the relevant TSOs. Common methodologies are 
necessary to calculate, inter alia: whether an interested 
capacity provider can provide the technical 
performance as required by the relevant capacity 
mechanism; the maximum available entry capacity for 
the participation of foreign capacity; a method to share 
revenues; and a system to determine when a so-called 
non-availability penalty is due and can be collected. It 
will fall to ENTSO-E – the body representing 
European Transmission System Operators – to devise 
and submit these various methodologies to ACER – the 
Agency for the Cooperation of European Regulators. 
Within three months from the date of the receipt of 
ENTSO-E’s proposal, ACER may either approve it or 
amend it.
20
 
Convincing Member States to rely on surplus capacity 
availability in neighbouring Member States who may 
also in turn face shortages may prove difficult.  
Complex rules will be required to ensure that 
cross-border participation can be realised to its fullest 
extent. 
.  
                                                          
20
 (see Article 22 E-Regulation) 
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Wholesale markets – the ambitions 
for a new market design 
The Commission maintains that an ambitious new 
energy market design is needed not only to reflect the 
changing technical features of electricity production 
and systems but also to “meet consumers’ expectations, 
deliver real benefits from new technology, facilitate 
investments, notably in renewables and low carbon 
generation, and recognise the interdependence of 
European Member States when it comes to energy 
security”. 
Market design is the set of arrangements which govern 
how market actors generate, trade, supply and consume 
electricity and use the electricity infrastructure. It is 
important that these arrangements “can transform the 
energy system, and enable network operators, 
generators and consumers – both households and 
industry – to take full advantage of new technology”.21  
We have identified the following features of the new 
Package, with a focus on the operation of transmission 
networks. Networks are often referred to as the 
‘hardware’ of a well functioning wholesale market. The 
Commission aims to ensure a more co-ordinated 
regional approach to transmission system operations 
with the creation of new Regional Operational Centres 
(ROCs). To a certain extent the regulatory supervision 
of these new entities will be carried out at European 
level by ACER. 
 
BOX 4: WHOLESALE MARKET 
 The Role of Regional Operational Centres – ROCs 
 Who pays the ROCs? 
 Who regulates the ROCs? 
 Activating the demand side 
                                                          
21
 Launching the public consultation process on a new energy 
market design COM (2015) 340 final Sources: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5358_en.htm; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5351_en.htm 
What is a Regional Operational 
Centre?  
All TSOs within a region designated by ACER under 
its new tasks (see below) will have to set up a ROC (in 
the territory of one of the Member States within the 
region). According to Article 32(3) of the E-
Regulation: “Regional operational centres shall 
complement the role of transmission system operators 
by performing functions of regional relevance. They 
shall establish operational arrangements in order to 
ensure the efficient, secure and reliable operation of 
the interconnected transmission system”. A list of the 
ROCs’ tasks is set out in Article 34. These tasks are to 
ensure a “coordinated capacity calculation”, “facilitate 
the regional procurement of balancing capacity”, draw 
up “regional week ahead to intraday system adequacy 
forecasts and preparation of risk reducing actions”, 
and a number of tasks relating to coordinated 
management of crisis situations. ROCs have the power 
to adopt decisions that are binding on the member 
TSOs (Article 38 of the E-Regulation). ROCs report to 
ACER as well as to the relevant national regulatory 
authorities (NRA)s. 
Who pays the costs of regionalisation? 
The E-Regulation is silent on this matter yet the costs 
and benefits of regional cooperation may not always be 
shared equally among the members. The E-Regulation 
states that ROCs shall complement the role of TSOs by 
performing “functions of regional relevance”. ROCs 
are to be equipped with all the relevant resources, 
including financial resources for fulfilling their 
obligations and carrying out their functions (Article 
42). The national TSOs must bear the burden. 
Importantly ROCs may incur liability to system users if 
they make the wrong decisions on operational security, 
for example. Article 44 of the E-Regulation states that 
ROCs should “take necessary steps to cover liability 
related to the execution of their tasks”.  
In the longer term ROCS are likely to render national 
system operations increasingly redundant and may 
even take over decisions on grid investment. Parties 
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paying the costs for infrastructure upgrades, for 
example, are not necessarily those who enjoy the 
benefits. Strengthening or expanding the transmission 
grid or constructing a new interconnector may lead to 
the imposition of higher costs for certain system users, 
and NRAs will be expected to pass those costs on into 
national tariffs.  
How are regulatory decisions to be 
made: coordination not centralisation 
The Winter Package foresees a reinforced role for the 
Agency albeit that it shies away from centralising 
regulatory powers in the hands of ACER, an option 
that was not received favourably during the 
consultation exercise. Stronger regulatory cooperation 
within ACER is seen as prerequisite to achieving the 
EU Energy and Climate goals. The principal role of 
ACER as a coordinator (or a platform for the 
co-ordination) of the actions of national regulatory 
authorities is preserved but limited new competencies 
are to be assigned to ACER when fragmented national 
decision making on issues of cross-border relevance 
could lead to problems or inconsistencies for the 
internal market.
22
 For example, ACER is to be given 
new tasks, especially in respect of the supervision of 
the regional operation of the energy system, albeit that 
the NRAs remain at the centre of regulation.
23
 The 
NRAs of the geographical areas in which a ROC is 
established will be expected to regulate that ROC and 
issue joint binding decisions. (See Article 62 of the 
E-Directive). Finally ACER is given new powers to 
approve the EU-wide methodology for assessing 
generation adequacy, which will govern Member 
States’ ability to set up capacity remuneration 
mechanisms (Article 10 of the ACER Regulation). 
Integrating prosumers and demand 
response into the wholesale market  
The Commission claims that there is a lot to be done on 
the demand side of electricity markets to ensure that 
they work for the full benefit of business and 
household consumers, as well as for “prosumers”,.who 
produce energy through self-generation or sell surplus 
electricity back to the grid.
24
 Demand response
25
 
embraces more than just efficient use of energy.  It is 
an important source of flexibility in the power system.  
                                                          
22
 Article 7 and 9 of the ACER Regulation 
23
 Article 8 of the ACER Regulation  
24
 This concept is discussed below under ‘Retail Markets’. 
25
 Article 2(16) of the E-Directive defines this concept 
Active consumers should be able to shift their demand 
in real time, reducing peak load. 
The third package of 2009 did not anticipate the 
importance of the demand side or contemplate the need 
to encourage flexible demand-side management or 
electricity storage (see below). In the Commission’s 
view inadequate market signals as well as regulatory 
obstacles are frustrating progress: stimulating adequate 
levels of demand response and active prosumer 
participation in wholesale markets.  In sum, a level 
playing field between conventional supply side sources 
and demand-side options is needed to ensure a cost 
efficient transformation to a more flexible electricity 
system.  Will these regulatory obstacles be 
systematically removed across the Union?  
The E-Directive, for example, proposes only a 
minimum level of harmonisation. Article 17(3) requires 
that Member States shall encourage the participation of 
aggregators in the market and that the aggregator can 
enter the market without consent from other market 
participants. Transparent rules clearly assigning roles 
and responsibilities to all market participants should be 
in place, including rules and procedures for data 
exchange between market participants, and there 
should be a conflict resolution mechanism. 
Demand response and the role of prosumers are further 
discussed in greater detail below in the context of retail 
market reform.  
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Distribution – the key to flexibility 
As the energy system evolves and becomes more 
complex due to the use of distributed or decentralised 
renewable energy sources and flexibility of demand, 
the need for coordination between market parties 
becomes even more important. Thus, the European 
Commission proposes to strengthen the legislative 
framework for cooperation between Distribution 
System Operators (DSOs) and TSOs to ensure that all 
necessary information and data, e.g. regarding the daily 
operation and long-term planning of the networks, is 
shared, and that the use of distributed resources is 
coordinated. The aim is to ensure cost-efficiency and 
secure and reliable operation of the networks. 
The traditional monopoly roles of DSOs are being 
increasingly contested with the emergence of private 
and micro-grids. At the same time the current role of 
DSOs in the energy value chain is very divergent 
across the 28 Member States. This is in part due to 
national variations in the degree of consolidation as 
well as the extent of unbundling (there are an estimated 
2400 DSOs active in the 28 Member States). Although 
the traditional or so-called “passive network” duties of 
the DSOs are adequately defined in the current legal 
framework, the scope for DSOs to engage in what is 
termed “active network operation” is far from clear. 
 
We have singled out the following issues. 
BOX 5: DISTRIBUTION 
 Incentives to innovate 
 DSO-TSO cooperation 
 A new DSO entity for electricity 
 DSO unbundling 
 Storage and EV- charging infra  
 Community networks  
Incentives to innovate 
So-called incentive regulation for DSOs has been 
successful in mimicking competitive pressure, with 
incentives to improve cost-efficiency and incentives to 
improve quality. The level of network investment that 
is to be required of DSOs to facilitate the energy 
transition may span several regulatory periods, and this 
may pose a challenge to traditional forms of incentive 
regulation where network charging methodologies are 
fixed for ,three to five-year intervals. Regulators need 
to make sure that the DSOs have adequate financial 
incentives to innovate and upgrade their networks, to 
procure and connect distributed generation and to 
contract with other service providers, as well as to deal 
with local congestion management.
26
  
In the future the Commission may use its delegated 
powers to adopt guidelines on distribution tariff 
structures to address this issue. This could however 
prove controversial as tariff issues are usually 
considered the preserve of national regulators. 
DSO-TSO cooperation27  
As smaller, distributed generation emerges alongside 
large scale conventional generation the traditional 
distinction between transmission and distribution 
becomes increasingly blurred. In a system where 
distribution networks are no longer passive but are 
expected to provide various services for the entire 
system, the exchange of information between TSOs 
and DSOs will increase considerably and this aspect 
has to be managed adequately. The choice of the 
coordination scheme not only determines the 
responsibilities of systems operators towards each 
other but also determines their responsibilities towards 
third parties (suppliers, aggregators, energy service 
companies). The European regulators’ informal council 
– the CEER – had earlier advised that general 
principles should be defined at a European level, while 
more detailed regulation for the implementation of 
common principles in the respective countries should 
be developed at a national level. The draft E-
Regulation mandates cooperation on certain issues, but 
does not determine any model or form of cooperation 
between TSOs and DSOs. This may evolve via the 
adoption of new network codes as well as through the 
amendment of existing codes. The new ‘DSO entity’ 
may be involved in that process.
28
 
                                                          
26
 Article 32 E-Directive 
27
 E-Regulation – Article 53 
28
 Electricity Regulation – Articles 55 and 56 
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A new DSO entity for electricity29  
The Commission proposes that DSOs, which are not 
part of a vertically integrated undertaking or are 
unbundled according to the recast E-Directive,
30
 shall 
cooperate through an EU DSO entity. The tasks of this 
entity are listed in Article 51 of the E-Regulation. All 
DSOs meeting these conditions will be able to apply 
for membership. Given the large number of DSOs in 
the EU and the heterogeneous nature of this sector, it is 
likely to be a major challenge for the new entity (in 
cooperation with ACER) to draw up a set of rules of 
procedure which can be both effective and 
representative of its potentially highly diverse 
membership.
31
 Concerns as to the independence of this 
new DSO entity may remain, however, if its members 
are not perceived to be adequately unbundled from 
competing production and supply interests. 
From passive to active system 
management – more DSO 
unbundling? 
The imposition of further unbundling requirements on 
DSOs has been rejected notwithstanding the 
acknowledged risk that, if DSOs are not unbundled, 
vertically integrated companies are favoured as a 
‘flexibility’ provider by the DSO. Equally, however, 
the current rules on unbundling may limit the trading of 
flexibility services by DSOs. Chapter IV of the recast 
E-Directive clarifies the tasks of DSOs in relation to 
the procurement of network services to ensure 
flexibility,
32
 the integration of electrical vehicles 
recharging points
33
 and data management
34
 and with 
respect to storage.
35
 
Storage36 and EV recharging networks  
Article 36 of the E-Directive provides that as a general 
rule DSOs shall not be allowed to own, develop, 
manage or operate energy storage facilities unless (a) 
following an open tender procedure no other party has 
expressed an interest in entering this market and (b) 
storage facilities are necessary for the DSOs to fulfil 
their regulated tasks for the reliable and secure 
                                                          
29
 Electricity Regulation – Articles 49 to 51 
30
 Article 35 E-Directive. The text is identical to the previous 
Article 26 of the E-Directive 
31
 E-Regulation - Article 50 on the rules of procedure 
32
 Article 32 
33
 Article 33 
34
 Article 34 
35
 Article 36 
36
 As defined in Article 2(48) 
operation of the distribution system.
37
 While Article 33 
does not prohibit DSOs from rolling out EV charging 
frameworks, similar conditions are attached as for 
storage in that it must first be established via an open 
tender procedure that no other party has expressed its 
interest in rolling out a recharging network. This 
situation should be reviewed at five-year intervals. 
Both EV and storage operations have to be operated by 
legally unbundled entities, as required under Article 35, 
and these entities must maintain separate accounts, as 
required by Article 56 of the E-Directive.  
Community networks – paying too 
much or too little for back-up?  
Local energy communities (LECs)
38
 can be an efficient 
way of managing energy at a local community level – 
with or without a connection to distribution systems. 
However, there is a risk that the principle of the 
socialisation of network costs is compromised if 
consumers in low cost areas (e.g. located near 
production centres) set up their own networks, leaving 
remaining consumers to finance networks in higher 
cost areas (e.g. rural areas). 
Article 16 of the E-Directive requires that Member 
States adopt a legal framework that ensures the 
possibility for local energy communities to own, 
establish or lease community networks and to 
autonomously manage them,
39
 and that these 
communities can access all organised markets either 
directly or through aggregators or suppliers. At the 
same time, if the local energy community consumes 
electricity from an external network it will be subject to 
‘appropriate network charges’, which must account 
separately for the electricity fed into the external 
network and the electricity consumed from it. Given 
that these measures will be contained in a Directive 
which may leave further latitude to Member States as 
to how they regulate LECs,  it is not clear whether a 
Member State could retain powers to enact a separate 
system of licensing for LECs. Nor is it clear whether 
the number of LECs in a region could be subject to a 
                                                          
37
 Article 54 – E-Directive applies a similar approach to TSOs 
albeit that any derogation from the general prohibition must 
be notified to the Agency and the Commission 
38
 This concept is defined in Article 2(6) to mean an 
association, a cooperative… or other legal entity which is 
effectively controlled by legal shareholders or members and 
is generally value rather than profit driven; although it 
performs its activities at local level this may extend across 
borders 
39
 Note that Chapter IV of the E-Directive will apply to these 
LECs if they perform the activities of a DSO 
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cap in the wider interest of ensuring a sufficiently large system user base for the socialisation of network costs . 
Retail markets – the promised new 
deal for consumers but will it come 
at a (market) price? 
The Commission considers that retail electricity 
markets have lacked a competition dynamic that would 
allow consumers to share in the benefits from 
competition upstream. Switching rates has proved 
disappointing, resulting in strengthened switching 
rights in the recast E- Directive.
40
 At the same time 
active customers – also referred to as prosumers – are 
to be encouraged to generate, store, consume and sell 
self-generated electricity on all organised markets – 
individually or through aggregators.
41
 This means 
striking the right balance between protecting passive 
consumers, and especially vulnerable consumers, while 
encouraging those customers who wish to do so to 
enter the market and actively take on the associated 
risks.
42
  It may also require a critical assessment of the 
need for detailed or overly prescriptive rules that could 
inhibit new participants from entering the energy 
market.  
We have identified the following issues for further 
comment. 
BOX 6 RETAIL MARKETS 
 Towards market-based retail prices  
 Billing  
 Data management  
 Prosumers and aggregators 
                                                          
40
 Article 12 E-Directive 
41
 Article 16 E-Directive 
42
 For example by taking up the entitlement to a ‘dynamic price 
contract’, see Article 11 E-Directive 
Towards market-based retail prices  
Article 5 of the E-Directive provides that, as a basic 
principle, electricity suppliers shall be free to determine 
the price at which they supply to customers. Member 
States may, however, ensure the protection of the 
energy poor
43
 or vulnerable customers in a “targeted 
manner by other means than public interventions in the 
price setting for the supply of electricity”. A 
transitional period of five years is foreseen under 
certain conditions. Thereafter price caps for vulnerable 
household customers could only be justified in cases of 
extreme urgency. The Commission will actively 
supervise such measures and may request their 
amendment or withdrawal. Article 9 limits the powers 
of national authorities to introduce public service 
obligations concerning price setting . If regulated 
prices are to be introduced to protect vulnerable 
customers, the procedures under Article 5 must be 
complied with.  The measures must be notified to and 
may be amended or vetoed by the Commission.  
Billing44  
The current provisions from the EED and the third 
electricity package on billing and billing information 
are maintained and merged in Article 18 of the draft E- 
Directive. The merged provisions include a list of 
minimum requirements for billing and billing 
information.
45
 Further, where appropriate, the 
following information should be prominently displayed 
in or with bills and periodical settlement bills: (a) 
current actual prices and actual consumption of energy; 
                                                          
43
 See also Article 29 E-Directive on reporting requirements 
44
 Electricity Directive - Article 17 and Annex II 
45
 For example, (a) price to pay, (b) energy consumption for 
billing period, (c) name of supplier, (d) contact details of 
supplier, including a consumer support hotline, (e) tariff 
name, (f) duration of the contract and date of end of contract 
and deadline for sending an advance notice of cancellation if 
fixed contract, and length of advance notice period for 
contracts of indeterminate duration 
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(b) comparisons of customers’ current energy 
consumption with consumption for the same period in 
the previous year in graphic form; (c) contact 
information for consumer organisations, energy 
agencies or similar bodies.  
Where a breakdown of price is presented in bills, 
Member States shall ensure that the European 
Commission’s definitions for the main components 
(energy and supply; network charges; taxes, fees, and 
levies) are used.  
Data management  
Delivery on a fair deal for energy consumers requires 
innovative companies to combine new energy 
technologies with digital technology to offer new 
products that support active consumers who wish to 
participate in electricity markets and optimise energy 
consumption (reducing and shifting) and save money. 
At the same time issues such as access to data, privacy 
and data protection, as well as cyber-security and 
issues of open standards and technology remain high 
on the Commission’s agenda. Some of these issues are 
now addressed in separate measures recently 
announced under the banner of the EU’s Digital Single 
Market strategy.
46
 Several are also addressed in the 
new energy MDI.
47
  
The Commission proposes to establish common rules 
for data management. Member States are obliged to 
specify who may have access to the data of the final 
customer with the customer’s explicit consent. Data in 
this context includes metering and consumption data 
and data required for switching and the ‘eligible’ 
parties potentially gaining access to these data are 
customers, suppliers, TSOs, DSOs, aggregators and 
other parties providing energy or other services to 
customers. The parties granted access to this data shall 
gain access to them simultaneously in a non-
discriminatory manner and on clear and equal terms. 
Member States (or their designated competent 
authorities) shall authorise/certify the parties managing 
data, but there is no specific data model recommended 
as yet. According to Article 24(3) of the E-Directive 
‘regulated entities’ which provide data services shall 
not profit from that activity, and no additional costs can 
be charged to final customers. 
                                                          
46
 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-single-
market. These include the General Data Protection 
Regulation, which enters into force in 2018, and the recently 
published proposal for an E-Privacy Regulation, of 10 
January 2017 
47
 Articles 23 and 33 E-Directive 
Member States are required to ensure that market 
participants apply a common European data format and 
non-discriminatory and transparent procedures for 
accessing the data. A common European data format 
shall be established by the Commission by means of an 
implementing act. 
Prosumers and aggregators  
Article 17 of the E-directive requires NRAs to 
encourage final consumers, including those offering 
demand response
48
 through aggregators
49
 and ‘active 
customers’50 to participate alongside generators in a 
non-discriminatory manner in all ‘organised markets’.51 
Article 13 of the E-Directive gives final customers the 
right to contract with an aggregator directly, and 
without the prior consent of the energy supplier. 
Conditions for termination are also to be regulated 
(Article 13(2)-(5)). Article 17 sets out the minimum 
conditions which Member States must adopt into 
national regulatory frameworks to encourage the 
participation of aggregators in retail markets. They 
should not be required to pay compensation to 
suppliers or generators but may exceptionally be 
required to pay compensation to balance responsible 
parties.
52
  
It remains to be seen whether the proponents of 
demand side respone will consider these provisions as 
sufficiently robust to ensure a genuine role for the 
demand side of the energy market going forward. 
Conventional suppliers of electricity are equally keen 
to ensure that these new market entrants do not benefit 
from hidden privileges or cross-subsidies.   
 
                                                          
48
 As defined in Article 2(16) E-Directive 
49
 As defined in Article 2(14) E-Directive 
50
 As defined in Article 2(6) and further elaborated on inn 
Article 15 E-Directive 
51
 This concept is borrowed from the REMIT implementing 
regulations 1348/2014, OJ 2014 L363/121 
52
 As defined in Article 2(49 E-Directive) 
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Conclusion  
This Briefing Paper has offered an overview of some of 
the most salient and controversial issues that are 
covered in the bumper Winter Package. Stakeholders 
are confronted with the formidable task of digesting 
and commenting on these ambitious proposals. If and 
when they are adopted, these legislative measures are 
likely to have a far-reaching impact on every actor in 
the energy value chain. The arrival of the Winter 
Package marks an important step change in the 
organisation as well as the regulation of the EU 
electricity market and, as explained in this Briefing 
Paper, such a step change inevitably raises novel legal 
issues and challenges. 
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